Disciplinary Decisions

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF BAR OVERSEERS OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

______________________________ ) In the Matter of ) KRIS C. FOSTER, ) Petition for Reinstatement ) ______________________________)

SJC No. BD-2022-060

HEARING PANEL REPORT I. Introduction On January 22, 2025, the petitioner, Kris C. Foster, filed a petition for reinstatement with the Supreme Judicial Court after a one-year-and-one-day suspension. The order of suspension was entered on November 1, 2023. See Ex. 1, 1 at Ex. A (Matter of Foster et al., 492 Mass. 724, 39 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. __ (2023), Ex. B (Judgment After Rescript, dated November 1, 2023), Ex. C (Order of Term Suspension in Accordance with Judgment After Rescript, dated November 7, 2023), and Ex. D (Order, dated November 17, 2023). The petitioner, a former Assistant Attorney General, was suspended based on her role related to the withholding of exculpatory evidence during the prosecution of a state drug laboratory chemist for evidence tampering. The petitioner’s misconduct was a factor in thousands of both pending drug charges being dismissed and drug convictions being vacated. An in-person hearing was held on July 21, 2025. The petitioner, represented by counsel, testified on her own behalf and called one witness, Ralph Sacramone. Bar counsel called no

1 The transcript is referred to as “Tr.__.” and the hearing exhibits is referred to as “Ex.__.” We have considered all of the evidence, but we have not attempted to identify all evidence supporting our findings where the evidence is cumulative. We credit the testimony cited in support of our findings to the extent of the findings, and we do not credit contradictory testimony.

witnesses. Eight exhibits were admitted into evidence. Exs. 1-8. 2 At the end of the hearing, the petition was opposed by bar counsel. After considering the evidence and testimony, we find that the petitioner has met her burden in these proceedings and we recommend that the petition of Kris C. Foster for reinstatement be allowed. II. Standard A petitioner for reinstatement to the bar bears the burden of proving that she has satisfied the requirements for reinstatement set forth in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18(5); namely that she possesses “the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth, and that his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or to the public interest.” Matter of Weiss, 474 Mass. 1001, 1002, 32 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 263, 264-265 (2016). The S.J.C.’s rule establishes two distinct requirements, focusing on (1) the personal characteristics of the petitioner and (2) the effect of reinstatement on the bar and the public. Matter of Gordon, 385 Mass. 48, 52, 3 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 69, 73 (1982). In making these determinations, a panel considering a petition for reinstatement “looks to ‘(1) the nature of the original offense for which the petitioner was [suspended], (2) the petitioner’s character, maturity, and experience at the time of [her suspension], (3) the petitioner’s occupations and conduct in the time since [her suspension], (4) the time elapsed since the [suspension], and (5) the petitioner’s present competence in legal skills.’” Matter of Alfred C.W. Daniels, 442 Mass. 1037, 1038, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 120, 122-123 (2004),

2 Exhibit 2 is impounded.

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quoting Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 92 (1996), and Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 460, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 122, 133 (1975). III. Disciplinary History The petitioner was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in December 2008. Ex. 1, at BBO0002. She began her legal career at the appellate division of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office. Tr. 82 (petitioner). During her time there, she argued more than sixty cases before the Appeals Court and nine before the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”). Tr. 83 (petitioner). In July 2013, she joined the appeals division of the Attorney General’s Office’s (“AGO”) Criminal Bureau. See Tr. 83 (petitioner). Among other things, in this position she handled responding to criminal appeals, federal habeas corpus petitions, and subpoenas to public agencies. Tr. 84-85 (petitioner). A. The Farak Drug Lab Scandal In January 2013, months before the petitioner joined the AGO, the Massachusetts State Police began investigating a state drug lab chemist, Sonja Farak, for potential tampering with drug samples that had been submitted to the state lab in Amherst for testing. Matter of Foster et al., supra at 727. State Police Sergeant Joseph Ballou was part of a team of investigators who executed a search warrant on Farak’s car, which resulted in obtaining evidence including various paperwork. Following the search, the State Police secured the evidence at the State Police barracks in Springfield. Id. Shortly thereafter, Farak was arrested and charged with evidence tampering and possession of cocaine and heroin. 3 Id.

3 According to the petitioner, her understanding of the allegations against Farak was that “when [Farak] would test drugs, if [the drugs] tested positive, she would steal them and replace them with a counterfeit [substance] and use [the drugs] herself.” Tr. 89 (petitioner).

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At the time of Farak’s arrest, John Verner was the chief of the AGO’s Criminal Bureau. He assigned Anne Kaczmarek, an Assistant Attorney General in the Enterprise, Major, and Cyber Crimes Division of the Criminal Bureau, as the lead prosecutor in the Farak case. Id. The SJC found that both Verner and Kaczmarek “understood early” that criminal defendants with pending drug cases, as well as individuals who had already been convicted based on Farak’s drug analyses, would be entitled to receive potentially exculpatory information 4 obtained during the State Police and AGO investigation / prosecution. Id. at 728. Because the drug cases against the criminal defendants were largely prosecuted by the district attorneys’ offices, the AGO would provide the information from the Farak investigation / prosecution to the district attorneys’ offices who would then provide it to the defendants. Id. However, Kaczmarek failed to turn over documents including mental health worksheets recovered from Farak’s car which “detailed Farak’s struggles with drug addiction, as well as her failed efforts to resist using drugs at work. Handwritten notes on these papers suggested that Farak’s misconduct may have had a longer history than the AGO had realized.” Id. at 729-30. Kaczmarek was aware of the mental health worksheets because Ballou had discussed them with her by phone and emailed them to her and Verner in February 2013. Id. at 729-30. Six months later, in August of 2013, approximately six weeks after joining the AGO (Tr. 91-92 (petitioner)), the petitioner was assigned to respond to subpoenas and discovery motions filed by defendants in the drug cases who were seeking information related to Farak’s conduct. Id. at 733-34. The petitioner had never responded to a subpoena before. Tr. 92 (petitioner). Although a superior told the petitioner to speak to Kaczmarek and Ballou to determine what had

4 Exculpatory information is any evidence that tends to “negate the guilt, or to reinforce the innocence, of the accused.” Graham v. District Attorney for Hampden District, 493 Mass. 348, 364 (2024), citing Commonwealth v. Diaz, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 588, 594 (2022).

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yet to be turned over to defense counsel, she did not do so. Id. at 734-35. She also did not review Ballou’s file herself. Id. at 735. Instead, the petitioner drafted and filed a motion to quash a subpoena which, among other things, asserted that some of the documents requested were protected by privilege. Id. On September 9, 2013, the petitioner appeared in Superior Court, representing the AGO, for a hearing before Judge C. Jeffrey Kinder. Id. at 736. The purpose of the hearing was to determine “the timing and scope of…Farak’s alleged criminal conduct.” Id. at 734. Ballou testified at the hearing that “everything in my case file has been turned over.” Id. at 736. As the SJC found, this may have been true, but Ballou’s file was just one component of the total material that the State Police and AGO had in their possession. In fact, the mental health worksheets found in Farak’s car were physically located at the Springfield barracks. 5 Id. At the end of the hearing, Judge Kinder ordered the petitioner to send him all responsive documents for which the AGO was asserting a claim of privilege so that he could review them in camera. Id. at 737. Following the hearing, there was an email exchange between Verner and Kaczmarek, which included the petitioner and others, in which Kaczmarek appeared to confirm that the mental health worksheets were in Ballou’s file. Later that day, during a meeting, Kaczmarek informed the attendees, including the petitioner, that she believed (consistent with Ballou’s testimony at the hearing) that everything in Ballou’s file had been turned over. Id. at 738. At a meeting days later, the petitioner’s supervisor told her that everything had been turned over and she should draft a letter to Judge Kinder saying so. The petitioner drafted the letter and gave it to

5 Hard copies of the mental health worksheets were in Kaczmarek’s trial box (Ex. 4, at ¶ 71) and electronic copies existed elsewhere, including on Kaczmarek’s and Verner’s computers. Matter of Foster et al., supra at 731.

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her supervisor to review and approve. He did so. The letter stated, in relevant part, “After reviewing Sergeant Ballou’s file, every document in his possession has already been disclosed.” Id. at 739 (emphasis added). However, as the SJC later found, no one at the AGO, including the petitioner, had reviewed Ballou’s file or determined whether every document in his possession had been disclosed. Id. The following month, October 2013, the parties returned to court where the petitioner again represented to Judge Kinder that Ballou’s entire file had been produced. Id. at 740. She told the judge, “I have talked to [Kaczmarek and Ballou] and both of them said there’s nothing – there’s no smoking gun…” Id. The petitioner’s conduct, in part, caused Judge Kinder to deny discovery requests from the criminal defendants, reasoning that they had failed to show that Farak had been using drugs or tampering with evidence in 2011 or earlier when the defendants were arrested. Id. at 741. In January 2014, Farak pleaded guilty. Months later, in October 2014, counsel for defendants in related drug cases were granted access to evidence stored at the Springfield barracks. See id. At that time, the mental health worksheets were discovered. Id. at 741-42. In December 2016, Superior Court Judge Richard Carey held a six-day evidentiary hearing on renewed motions to dismiss and motions for new trials or to withdraw guilty pleas filed by defendants “who claimed a right to relief based on Farak’s tampering and the AGO’s misconduct.” Id. at 742. The petitioner, Kaczmarek, and Verner, testified at the hearing. Id. The judge granted relief to some of the defendants and the Committee for Public Counsel Services sought relief at the SJC pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3. Id. Ultimately, in October 2018, the SJC ordered relief for defendants affected by Farak’s misconduct and dismissed thousands of cases where drugs had been tested at the Amherst lab because “the government misconduct by Farak

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and the assistant attorneys general was ‘so intentional and so egregious.” Id. at 743, quoting Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 725 (2018). B. The Disciplinary Proceeding In June 2019, bar counsel filed a three-count petition for discipline collectively against the petitioner, Kaczmarek, and Verner. Only the third count involved the petitioner and alleged violations resulting from her responses to the subpoena and discovery motions. Id. at 743. A special hearing officer (“SHO”) was appointed and an evidentiary hearing was held over twenty-three days. Id. The petitioner testified over three days: October 27, 28, and 29, 2020. The SHO concluded that the petitioner had violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1 (provide competent representation), 1.2(a) (seek lawful objectives of client through reasonably available means permitted by law and rules of professional conduct), and 1.3 (act with diligence in representing client), by “failing to adequately prepare to respond to subpoenas and appear at hearings regarding the production of evidence and by failing to ensure that the AGO reviewed Ballou’s file.” Id. at 745; Ex. 4 (Hearing Report). The SHO also determined that by “drafting a letter with reckless disregard for the truth that misled the judge to believe that the entirety of the file had been reviewed and all documents had been produced,” the petitioner violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(d) (do not engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), and 8.4(h) (do not engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law). Matter of Foster et al., supra at 745. The SHO found that “although a ‘close call,’ [the petitioner’s] use of intentionally vague language [in the letter to Judge Kinder] did not rise to the level of conduct

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sanctioned by rule 8.4(c); 6 while grossly incompetent and reckless, [the petitioner’s] statements were not knowingly false statements of material fact.” Id. at 757. The SHO filed a supplemental report which detailed aggravating and mitigating factors for each respondent as well as his recommended sanctions. Ex. 5 (Supplemental Report). With respect to the petitioner, the SHO found multiple aggravating factors including lack of candor and the extent of the harm to vulnerable third parties caused by the petitioner’s recklessness. Matter of Foster et al., supra at 764. He specifically found her testimony at the disciplinary hearing to be “dissembling, disingenuous[ ], and evasive[ ].” Id. at 763. The SHO recommended a term suspension of one-year-and-one-day for the petitioner. Id. at 745. Following appeals by both bar counsel and the petitioner, in June 2022, the Board of Bar Overseers (“board”) adopted the factual findings of the SHO and recommended that the petitioner be suspended for one-year-and-one-day for her violations that, “for the most part, amounted to ‘gross incompetence’ and ‘reckless lawyering.’” Id. at 725, quoting Board Memorandum (Ex. 8). The board filed an Information with the single justice who, in November 2022, reserved and reported the case to the full bench. Matter of Foster et al., supra at 746. Before the full bench of the SJC, bar counsel appealed from the board’s determination that the petitioner did not violate Rule 8.4(c) and the petitioner appealed from the sanction recommended by the board. Id. at 757. The SJC agreed with the board that the petitioner had not violated Rule 8.4(c) “[b]ecause there is insufficient evidence that [the petitioner] knew the AGO had exculpatory evidence that had yet to be turned over, and was not willfully blind to this fact…” Id. at 759. The SJC found two mitigating factors: (1) the petitioner’s lack of experience

6 Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4(c) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to…engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation…”

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in responding to subpoenas (to which it assigned “minimal weight”); and (2) her reasonable and good faith reliance on (a) her supervisor with respect to her letter to Judge Kinder (where the supervisor told her that everything had been turned over and approved her letter before filing) and (b) her colleague, Kaczmarek’s, misrepresentations about what had been turned over to defense counsel. Id. at 761-62. However, the SJC noted that it did not assign greater weight to the petitioner’s reliance (a special mitigating factor) for two reasons: (1) the petitioner “was making affirmative representations in court filings, on which she signed her name. It should have been abundantly clear to [the petitioner] that it was her responsibility to verify the truth of her own representations[ ]”; and (2) the petitioner added her own “gloss” to the information given to her for the letter to Judge Kinder which was reckless and misleading. 7 Id. at 762. The SJC accepted the board’s recommendation as to the petitioner’s sanction “[b]ecause [the petitioner] was reckless in her representations about what the AGO had disclosed, and otherwise exhibited incompetence in her response to the subpoena and discovery motions…” Id. at 726. The court specifically noted that the petitioner’s lack of candor, lack of awareness of her wrongdoing, and lack of remorse before the SHO “all weigh heavily in aggravation.” Id. at 763. The SJC adopted the recommendation of the board and entered a term suspension of one-year-and-one-day. 8 Ex. 1, at BBO0038. In November 2023, the petitioner was ordered suspended effective retroactively to September 28, 2023. Ex. 1, at BBO0044 (Order on Assented to Motion for Effective Date of Suspension to Run from Rescript Date).

7 The SJC found that the first statement, “After reviewing Sergeant Ballou’s file,” was not based on anything told to her by Kaczmarek or her supervisor because neither had indicated to her that the file had been reviewed. Matter of Foster et al., supra at 762.

8 Verner received a public reprimand. Kaczmarek was disbarred. Id. at 770-71.

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IV. Findings and Conclusions Our findings and conclusions are set forth in three sections: moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law, and the public interest. A. Moral Qualifications The conduct giving rise to the petitioner’s suspension is affirmative proof that she lacked the moral qualifications to practice law. See Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 460, 1 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 134. That the misconduct “continues to be evidence against . . . [the petitioner] with respect to lack of moral character at later times [is] in accordance with the principle that ‘a state of things once proved to exist may generally be found to continue.’” Id. (citation omitted). “The act of reinstating an attorney involves what amounts to a certification to the public that the attorney is a person worthy of trust.” Matter of Alfred C. W. Daniels, 442 Mass. at 1038, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 123, Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. at 92; see Matter of Centracchio, 345 Mass. 342, 348 (1963). In fact, “considerations of public welfare are dominant. The question is not whether the petitioner has been punished enough.” Matter of Cappiello, 416 Mass. 340, 343, 9 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 44, 47 (1993), quoting Matter of Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 547 (1943). Cf. Matter of Nickerson, 422 Mass. 333, 337, 12 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 367, 375 (1996) (finding in a disciplinary proceeding that “‘[t]he question is not whether the respondent has been ‘punished’ enough. To make that the test would be to give undue weight to his private interests, whereas the true test must always be the public welfare.’”) (citation omitted). To gain reinstatement, the petitioner has the burden of proving that she has led “‘a sufficiently exemplary life to inspire public confidence once again, in spite of h[er] previous actions.’” Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. at 92, quoting Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 452, 1 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. at 126. She can do this by proving she has reformed, since a “fundamental precept

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of our system is that persons can be rehabilitated.” Matter of Ellis, 457 Mass. 413, 414, 26 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 162, 163 (2010). “Reform is a ‘state of mind’ that must be manifested by some external evidence…[and] the passage of time alone is insufficient to warrant reinstatement.” Matter of Waitz, 416 Mass. at 305, 9 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. at 343. We divide our discussion of the petitioner’s moral qualifications into the following subsections: (1) Insight into Misconduct; (2) Work and Volunteer Activities; (3) Witness Testimony and Letters; and (4) Conclusions as to Moral Qualifications. 1. Insight into Misconduct Before us, the petitioner explained that she believed that everything in the file of Massachusetts State Police Detective Sergeant Joseph Ballou had been produced. Tr. 92-94 (petitioner). She believed this to be true because her superiors and her colleague, Kaczmarek, had told her so. Id. However, she admitted that she did nothing to independently verify that her representations to the court were accurate and that everything had, in fact, been produced. Tr. 93 (petitioner). In addition, she acknowledged that she wrote a letter to Judge Kinder stating that the file had been reviewed, which was misleading, but denied that she intended to mislead. Tr. 124-25 (petitioner). She explained that she intentionally wrote the letter in the passive voice because she did not want to give the judge the false impression that she had reviewed the file. Tr. 94-95, 125-26 (petitioner). Her supervisor reviewed and approved the letter before it was sent to the judge. Tr. 95-96 (petitioner). Nevertheless, the letter was misleading because it begged the inference that she had reviewed the file and that all of the documents had been produced. Neither had occurred; as noted, the petitioner had done nothing to verify the accuracy of the representations she made in the letter to the judge. Tr. 95-96 (petitioner). We note here the importance of the fact that the petitioner was not found to have violated Rule 8.4(c) at any stage

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of the disciplinary process: her failures were lacking competence and diligence, compounded by reckless misrepresentations, and not by intentional misconduct. During her testimony, the petitioner was candid about her wrongdoing and how her understanding of it has evolved over time during and after the disciplinary proceedings. Initially, she was angry at her supervisors and co-workers because she had felt that she could rely on what they had told her about what was turned over. See Tr. 99, 102 (petitioner). She admits that she remains angry at them (Tr. 99 (petitioner)) but, through the underlying disciplinary process, she gained a different perspective of her conduct. She testified: A lot has changed since then. Going [to work at the Alcoholic Beverage and Control Commission (discussed infra)], there was no one to pass the buck to. I was general counsel. I couldn’t blame anyone else if I got something wrong or if I missed something. And also, once all these decisions started coming out, I got an appreciation for what outside parties viewed as the actual facts. You know, [the special hearing officer’s] decision, he got every bit of information he could. And then the SJC writing it, and confirming it. It really makes you see it from a different perspective.

Tr. 99-100 (petitioner). As the SJC noted, more was expected of the petitioner as a fifth-year attorney. Matter of Foster et al., supra at 760. At the same time, we appreciate that the petitioner was in a difficult position for a young attorney—she was six weeks into a new position and given an assignment she had never handled before. The petitioner admitted before us that she acted “recklessly” and acknowledged that she should have verified that the representations she was making to the court were accurate. See Tr. 98-99 (petitioner). She openly admitted that it took her a while to understand this. Tr. 99-102 (petitioner). We credit her testimony and find it pivotal to our recommendation. Based on our observations of the petitioner during her testimony, we are persuaded that she genuinely accepts responsibility for her role in the collective misconduct that led to people

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being incarcerated for a period of time or for a longer period of time. She stated, “…that’s one of the reasons I think I denied liability for so long because it’s very humbling to be put in this position where you’re responsible for the very egregious miscarriage of justice. You know, it’s hard to process having a role.” Tr. 101-02 (petitioner). She acknowledged the magnitude of the harm that she caused to vulnerable criminal defendants. Tr. 170 (petitioner) (“Q: You also agree that you caused great harm to vulnerable criminal defendants? A: I think that’s an understatement, but yes.”). She admitted that she lacked remorse and an awareness of her wrongdoing at the time of the disciplinary hearing. Tr. 169-70 (petitioner). However, she asserted that she started to feel remorse once she read the special hearing officer’s reports and then the Board’s memorandum. See Tr. 169-171 (petitioner). By the time of the SJC decision, she testified that “it started sinking in, that, you know, I had responsibility.” Id. We credit this testimony and find her to be remorseful. As noted supra, the SHO found multiple factors in aggravation including the petitioner’s lack of candor during her testimony at the disciplinary hearing. The SJC noted two examples of the petitioner’s lack of candor (1) her testimony that she was not trying to be intentionally vague in the letter to Judge Kinder; and (2) her testimony about her prior work experience. Matter of Foster et al., supra at 763. According to the SJC, the petitioner indicated on the resume that she submitted to the AGO that she had substantial Superior Court experience, including “second-seating” homicide cases and drafting and arguing postconviction motions. Before the SHO, however, she claimed that she had no Superior Court experience. When questioned about the discrepancy, [the petitioner] refused to agree that she had embellished her prior experience and, instead, claimed disingenuously that she had a different understanding of the terms “drafting” and “arguing” when she compiled her resume.

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Id. Initially, the petitioner testified before us that she disagreed with the SHO’s finding that she lacked candor during the disciplinary hearing. See Tr. 100, 126-27 (petitioner). Yet, later in her testimony, during questioning by the hearing panel, she stated that she does not disagree with that finding by the SHO. Tr. 186-87 (petitioner). She explained that, at the time of her testimony at the disciplinary hearing, she was denying, even to herself, that she had done anything wrong. See id. She testified, “In retrospect, now that – I do accept responsibility of that finding.” Tr. 187-88 (petitioner). When asked what part of her disciplinary hearing testimony was not “fully candid,” she discussed that during her testimony at the disciplinary hearing, part of what she testified to was that “…I was told everything had been turned over. What more could I do? And I said there was nothing more I could do. And I’ve had a lot of time to think about it, and there were several options that I could have – several paths I could have taken.” Tr. 188 (petitioner). She could not think of any other specific examples of testimony that was not candid. Tr. 188-89 (petitioner). We have no quarrel with the petitioner disagreeing with part or all of the SHO’s finding that she lacked candor at the disciplinary hearing. We do not require a petitioner to sign on and subscribe to every finding in the hearing report. Cf. Matter of Sablone, 40 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. __ (2024) (reinstatement allowed despite petitioner’s failure to understand, or fully explain, why he took money from his firm). Instead, our task requires us to determine if the petitioner has “adduce[d] substantial proof that [she] has ‘such an appreciation of the distinctions between right and wrong in the conduct of [people] toward each other as will make [her] a fit and safe person to engage in the practice of law.’” Matter of Hiss, supra at 457 (citation omitted). While we were troubled that this finding was made by the SHO about testimony given in 2020 (five years ago) and, frankly, it gave us pause, we heard the petitioner’s testimony before us and find her

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credible. In his closing, bar counsel suggested that the petitioner’s testimony before us was evasive and that it “was difficult to get straight answers.” Tr. 193-194 (Assistant Bar Counsel). While the petitioner did choose her words carefully, particularly on cross-examination (see, e.g. Tr. 126-130, 147-151 (petitioner)), we did not find her testimony to be evasive. By contrast, we find her testimony to be sincere. The petitioner proved to us that she understands the nature of her misconduct and has confronted the role she played in the wrongdoing that resulted in thousands of criminal cases being dismissed and convictions being vacated. We are persuaded that she has shown true remorse for her conduct and has learned from this experience. We believe she recognizes that it is a privilege to practice law and she will work hard to repair her professional reputation as a lawyer if reinstated. Tr. 115-116 (petitioner). 2. Work and Volunteer Activities In February 2015, a few months after the mental health worksheets were discovered by defense counsel (see supra at p. 6), the petitioner left the AGO to become the general counsel of the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (“ABCC”). Tr. 86, 103 (petitioner). In that position, she advised the Commission as well as the executive director, Ralph Sacramone (who testified before us as discussed infra). She also wrote many of the Commission’s violation decisions and helped draft legislation related to the Commonwealth’s liquor laws. Tr. 86-87 (petitioner). In August 2016, as mentioned above, the petitioner was subpoenaed to testify at a hearing in Superior Court before Judge Carey. Tr. 103-04 (petitioner). This was her first indication that there was an investigation into her conduct. Id. She notified Mr. Sacramone, her boss, that she would be testifying as a witness and gave him a copy of the judge’s decision when it issued. Tr.

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104-05 (petitioner). When the Office of Bar Counsel began its investigation into her conduct, she similarly notified Mr. Sacramone and kept him informed throughout the process, including giving him copies of documents such as the petition for discipline and the various reports and decisions (discussed in more detail infra). See Tr. 105-08 (petitioner). She remained the general counsel until her suspension in the fall of 2023. 9 Tr. 87 (petitioner). Typically, hearing panels considering reinstatement focus on the petitioner’s work during the period of suspension and not pre-suspension. However, here, there was a lengthy period between the discovery and investigation of the misconduct and the petitioner’s suspension. We find it particularly significant that after the misconduct at issue in the fall of 2013, the petitioner practiced law successfully for approximately ten years (over eight of those years at the ABCC) without new disciplinary charges or, presumably, complaints. See Tr. 117-118 (petitioner) (no complaints since these charges in 2013). The only additional misconduct was the SHO’s finding that the petitioner lacked candor during her testimony at the disciplinary proceeding. See Matter of Veara, 36 Mass. Att'y Disc. R. 433 (2020) (the lawyer practiced law without new disciplinary charges (although he was also found to have testified falsely during his disciplinary hearing) during the eleven years before he was suspended for one-year-and-one-day; in recommending reinstatement, the hearing panel found that this record “reflects that the misconduct that led to his suspension was a deviation from an otherwise clean record of the ordinary course of the petitioner’s practice” and it “[gave] great weight to the long period of ethical practice between the period of [his] chief misconduct and his suspension.”). While the SHO’s finding was

9 The petitioner testified that her last day at the ABCC was October 6, 2023. However, her suspension was effective September 28, 2023. The petitioner explained that the discrepancy in the dates is because the suspension order entered in November 2023 but was effective retroactively. Tr. 87-88 (petitioner); see Ex. 1, at BBO0044.

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concerning, as we explained supra, we find the petitioner’s lengthy post-misconduct, but pre-suspension, practice to be an indicator of post-misconduct moral rehabilitation. Evidence of moral reform can be found in good works that demonstrate a sense of responsibility to others. See Matter of Wong, 442 Mass. 1016, 1017-1018, 20 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 540, 544 (2004) (Court notes approvingly physical labor, active role in church community, participation in sons’ activities and community work); Matter of Sullivan, 25 Mass. Att’y Disc. R. 578, 583 (2009) (“[a] petitioner’s moral character can be illustrated by charitable activities, volunteer activities, commitment to family, or community work.”). Following her suspension, the petitioner testified about her caregiving responsibilities and volunteerism. She “took some time to focus on being a wife and a mother” and concentrated on volunteering at her young child’s school doing library and cafeteria duty. Tr. 88 (petitioner); Ex. 1, at BBO0003 (unemployed until January 2025, list of volunteer positions). She eventually became the enrichment co-coordinator, helping to plan field trips and in-school events. Id. She continued her school volunteer work as of the date of the hearing before us. Id. This dedicated commitment to her family also reflects positively on the petitioner’s moral fitness. In January of 2025, the petitioner began a nonlegal position as Executive Officer of the City of Cambridge License Commission. Tr. 80 (petitioner); Ex. 1, at BBO0003 and 0005. She is the administrative head of the office and spends most of her time preparing for public hearings, writing meeting minutes, and scheduling hearings. Tr. 80 (petitioner). If reinstated, she plans to stay in her current nonlegal position though she believes that a law license could be helpful in that role. Tr. 113-14 (petitioner); Ex. 1, at BBO0005-06. If she were to seek another legal role, it would be something in public service / a government agency; she has never worked