SUFFOLK, SS.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY No. BD-2025-057
IN RE: ANNA SHAPIRO
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION This matter came before me on an information and record of proceedings filed by the Board of Bar Overseers (board), pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009). As detailed in bar counsel's amended petition for discipline, the disciplinary proceedings arose from, inter alia, the respondent's excessive billing in four separate matters, her misrepresentation of fact to the tribunal in one matter, and her filing of a frivolous motion in another. Agreeing with a three-member hearing committee of the board that bar counsel proved all charged misconduct against the respondent, the board has recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for eighteen months. After consideration of the parties' arguments, I determine that the board's findings are supported by substantial evidence and conclude that all the charged misconduct has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, for the reasons discussed below, I conclude that the board's
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recommended eighteen-month suspension is an appropriate sanction. 1. Background. a. Facts. I summarize the facts found by the hearing committee and adopted by the board, supplemented with uncontested facts contained in the record. The respondent was admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth in December 2006. The next month, she opened a general practice firm where she primarily handled family law matters and some litigation. Four such matters are detailed below, corresponding to the four counts in the amended petition. i. Count one: The Melanson matter. In 2019, Michelle Melanson sought to be appointed guardian and conservator for her close friend, John Doe.1 Melanson hired the respondent pursuant to a written fee agreement. This was their second engagement, as the respondent previously represented Melanson in a divorce-related matter. On January 8, 2020, the respondent filed petitions in the Probate and Family Court to appoint Melanson as conservator and guardian for Doe. Delays were incurred, mostly because the respondent was unaware that a hearing on the petitions would not be automatically scheduled. Once requested, the hearing was set for April 28, 2020. Another delay ensued because the respondent did not know that she needed the written
1 A pseudonym.
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assent of Doe's two adult children. After the respondent sent assent forms, Doe's son sent text messages to the respondent with questions, which the respondent misleadingly described as "objections." Doe's son did not object to the petition, but was instead asking for clarification about the process. On April 5, 2020, Melanson expressed her frustration with the respondent about the pace of the case as well as the fees incurred, which had exceeded $11,000 by that point. During a call on April 8, 2020, the respondent offered to complete the work for an additional $6,000 flat fee, and to forgive an approximately $2,700 outstanding balance. The respondent sent Melanson a written amendment to the fee agreement, but Melanson did not sign it, expressing a desire to dismiss the petitions because the work was too expensive. At the respondent's direction, an associate at the respondent's firm drafted a motion to voluntarily dismiss both petitions, supported by an affidavit from Melanson that omitted any mention of the true reason for seeking dismissal. Instead, Melanson falsely averred the reason for the requested dismissal was "lack of agreement" between her and Doe's two children. Melanson knew this statement was false but signed the affidavit anyway, as she simply wanted to end the case and was willing to "blame it on the kids" if necessary. When the respondent filed the affidavit, she likewise knew this statement was untrue.
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After filing the motion to dismiss -- for which she charged the client -- the respondent received signed assent forms from both of Doe's children. The respondent did not inform the Probate and Family Court about the signed assent forms, nor did she file them. The court took no action on the motion to dismiss. The guardianship and conservatorship petitions were not dismissed until August and October 2023, and only then due to inactivity.2 The respondent's representation of Melanson -- which not only involved the respondent, but four associates and two paralegals from her firm -- lasted approximately four months. She billed a total of $15,624.70, an amount discounted by ten percent because Melanson was a repeat client. Of that total, about $4,600 was incurred before the respondent's filing of the petitions, which appears to have compromised most of the work. The balance was charged for work after the petitions were filed. The respondent claims she wrote off approximately $6,200 in charges. Melanson paid a total of $12,872.11. ii. Count two: The Rollins-Lyons matter. In May 2021, the respondent entered into an hourly fee agreement with Nia Rollins-Lyons. Pursuant to that agreement, the respondent
2 Nonetheless, Melanson was quickly appointed as Doe's guardian through a process initiated by the hospital caring for Doe. The respondent could have pursued such a process herself but did not do so.
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represented Rollins-Lyons in a Probate and Family Court matter concerning her ex-husband's visitation of their four year old son. The ex-husband had filed a complaint for contempt against Rollins-Lyons, alleging that she had been withholding visitation in violation of a Probate and Family Court judgment. Rollins-Lyons maintained that she was withholding visitation because she suspected her ex-husband was sexually abusing their child. Rollins-Lyons expressed to the respondent a strong desire to compel her ex-husband to submit to a polygraph examination. The respondent never advised Rollins-Lyons that her ex-husband could not be ordered to take a polygraph examination.3 Instead, in June 2021, the respondent filed a motion to compel the ex-husband's polygraph examination, citing Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426 (1978), a case that had been overruled. The ex-husband's lawyer opposed the motion to compel and moved for sanctions. The motion was never heard by the court. After a hearing on the ex-husband's contempt complaint, Rollins-Lyons was found in contempt for withholding visitation from the ex-husband and was ordered to pay him $2,000 in fees plus costs. Three days after the hearing, Rollins-Lyons fired the respondent. The engagement lasted about four weeks -- May
3 From the client's understanding, based on conversations with the respondent, she believed if the father did not agree to take the test, he could be "subpoenaed" to take it.
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25, 2021 through June 22, 2021 -- and the total bill was $22,308.85. In addition to the respondent herself, four employees from her firm -- one "senior" associate, four associates, and one paralegal -- had worked on the case. iii. Count three: The Kometti matter. From about February 2020 until April 2021, the respondent represented Erik Kometti in a matter concerning child custody, visitation, parenting time, and child support. The engagement was undertaken pursuant to an hourly fee agreement. When Kometti first contacted the respondent, Kometti had been served with a complaint for civil contempt alleging that he had failed to pay approximately $42,000 in child support and other expenses due under a court judgment. The respondent filed an answer to the complaint on Kometti's behalf, along with a cross complaint for modification of the judgment. During the course of discovery, disputes arose concerning the adequacy of the respondent's discovery responses. As a result, the respondent spent additional time discussing the responses with opposing counsel before submitting supplemental discovery responses. The parties eventually agreed to attend conciliation, which was held over four sessions between December 2020 and February 2021. However, Kometti did not appear at the last session. Unbeknownst to the respondent, Kometti had filed for bankruptcy
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on January 29, 2021. He then terminated the representation before any issues could be resolved. Although Kometti did not specifically blame the respondent, he testified that the mounting legal bills gave him anxiety and caused him to liquidate his retirement account. The fourteen-month engagement resulted in legal fees of $75,773.62, with the client paying slightly less than $50,000. Three partners, four associates, and two paralegals from the respondent's firm worked on the case. iv. Count four: The Zullo matter. In late 2021, Linda Zullo hired the respondent to handle her contested divorce, which centered on the marital home, the marriage's sole significant asset. Zullo had paid $250,000 toward a down payment on the home -- while her husband had contributed $30,000. Zullo also loaned her husband $20,000 for house repairs. The couple had been married for five years and had no children together. Other than a joint checking and savings account, the couple's finances were kept separate. Zullo had concerns about the fact that her husband was paying alimony to his former spouse out of their joint checking account. On March 3, 2022, a "four-way conference" between the two parties and their counsel was held, resulting in an agreement to resolve the divorce. Prior to the four-way conference, the respondent had prepared a short-form financial statement for the
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client. In the section of the statement related to her fees, the respondent wrote "[o]ngoing" rather than specifying the amount of fees incurred at the time. After additional negotiation, the parties filed a separation agreement on April 8, 2022. On August 1, 2022, a judgment of divorce nisi entered. Over the eight months of representation, the respondent billed Zullo $42,000, which reflected a ten percent discount for a "returning client," since the respondent previously represented the client's mother. Two partners, three associates, and one paralegal from the respondent's firm worked on the matter. b. Procedural history. Bar counsel commenced disciplinary proceedings against the respondent by filing a petition for discipline on June 29, 2022. A four-count amended petition was filed on December 9, 2022. In each of its four counts, the amended petition alleged that by charging and collecting clearly excessive fees from one of the four aforementioned clients, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), as amended, 480 Mass. 1315 (2018) (clearly excessive fees).4 In January 2023, the respondent filed an answer to the amended petition.
4 Additionally, count one alleged that by knowingly misrepresenting Melanson's reason for seeking dismissal of the petitions, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015). Further, count two alleged that by filing and pursuing the motion to
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After a public hearing was held over six days in June 2023, the hearing committee issued its report on November 14, 2024. The committee concluded that bar counsel had proved the violations alleged in all four counts of the amended petition.5 The committee found no mitigating factors. Conversely, the committee identified various aggravating factors.6 Based on the foregoing, a majority of the committee recommended that the respondent be suspended for eighteen months.7
compel Rollins-Lyons's ex-husband to submit to a polygraph examination when competent and diligent legal research would have revealed that such relief was unavailable, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1311 (2015); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1318 (2015); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015). Finally, count two also alleged that by failing to advise Rollins-Lyons as to the lack of a reasonable, good faith basis in law upon which the ex-husband could be ordered to take a polygraph test, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) (2) and (b), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1319 (2015).
5 Concerning the rule 1.5 (a) violations, the hearing committee found that the hourly rates the respondent charged for herself and her partners were reasonable and consistent with rates charged by similarly-sized firms in the same area. However, the hearing committee found that the rates for the respondent's paralegals and associates were excessive, particularly given the associates' lack of experience. Further, the committee credited bar counsel's expert, over the respondent's expert, that a reasonable fee for each client matter would have been as follows: $7,500 in the Melanson matter; $7,500 in the Rollins-Lyons matter; $25,000 to $30,000 in the Kometti matter; and $10,000 in the Zullo matter.
6 These factors are discussed infra.
7 A single dissenting member recommended that the respondent instead be suspended for one year and one day.
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In February 2025, the respondent appealed to the full board, seeking public reprimand as the appropriate sanction. After oral arguments, the board issued its decision on July 14, 2025, in which it adopted the committee's factual findings and legal conclusions. The board voted unanimously to adopt the committee's recommended sanction of an eighteen-month suspension. Thereafter, on July 20, 2025, an information and record of proceedings was filed in the county court. I held a hearing on the matter on October 23, 2025, at which the respondent appeared. 2. Discussion. In an attorney disciplinary proceeding, bar counsel bears the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent engaged in the alleged violations. See Matter of Kelley, 489 Mass. 300, 305 (2022). A reviewing court affords great weight to the recommendations of the board and upholds the board's subsidiary findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. See Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 879 (2010). See also S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6). "Substantial evidence is that which 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion'" Matter of Angwafo, 453 Mass. 28, 34 (2009), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6). The court, however, is not
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bound by the board's ultimate findings and may reach its own conclusions. See Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. 481, 487 (1996). Here, after carefully examining the record before the board, I conclude that the committee's factual findings, as adopted by the board, are supported by substantial evidence. I now proceed with examining the respondent's rule violations, any aggravating factors, and, finally, the appropriate sanction. a. Rule violations. Based on the factual findings adopted by the board, I agree with the board's conclusions that the respondent not only violated rule 1.5 (a) as to all four of her clients, but also, as to Rollins-Lyons, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1311 (2015) (competence); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1318 (2015) (diligence); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) (2) and (b), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1319 (2015) (communication with client); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015) (meritorious claims and contentions). Further, as to Melanson, I agree that the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015) (candor toward tribunal). I consider each rule violation in turn. i. Violations of rule 1.5 (a). A lawyer is prohibited from charging or collecting a "clearly excessive" fee. Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a). Rule 1.5 (a) sets forth eight factors for consideration in determining whether a fee is clearly excessive.
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See id. Here, in determining that the respondent's fees were clearly excessive as to all four of her clients, the board focused particularly on factors one, four, and seven. Factor one concerns "the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly." Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a) (1). Factor four concerns "the amount involved and the results obtained." Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a) (4). Factor seven concerns "the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services." Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a) (7). Here, as the board explained, each of those factors suggest the respondent's fees were clearly excessive. With respect to factor one, all four client matters were standard family law cases, none of which required a remarkable amount of legal research, briefing, or discovery; indeed, there was minimal written discovery, no depositions, and no experts.8 Next, with respect to factor four, the respondent failed to obtain
8 Despite this, across all four matters, multiple lawyers and paralegals were staffed, often performing redundant work or billing at legal rates for routine tasks, such as copying correspondence or records into the firm's computer system. Additionally, multiple lawyers would bill for drafting a routine pleading and for hearing preparation far in advance of a scheduled hearing.
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desirable results in any client's case, except for Zullo's case.9 Finally, with respect to factor seven, bar counsel's expert opined that in light of the limited experience of the associates at the respondent's firm -- with many being recent law school graduates and none having more than three years of experience -- their rates were unreasonable. See Matter of Fordham, 423 Mass. at 490 ("It cannot be that an inexperienced lawyer is entitled to charge three or four times as much as an experienced lawyer for the same service"). Based on the testimony of bar counsel's expert, for which there was an adequate factual basis, the respondent's clients were charged fees that ranged from about two to four times what would have been reasonable -- with the respondent's charges collectively exceeding a reasonable amount by over $100,000. See Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. 1016, 1020 (2018) (respondent failed to demonstrate expert opinion concerning unreasonableness of respondent's fees had inadequate factual basis). Accordingly, as the board determined, bar counsel proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated rule 1.5 (a) with respect to all four clients. ii. Violations of rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 3.1. A lawyer must (1) provide competent representation to a client, see Mass.
9 As detailed supra, Zullo and her ex-husband executed a separation agreement.
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R. Prof. C. 1.1; (2) act without reasonable diligence in representing a client, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3; and (3) abstain from asserting an issue for which there is no nonfrivolous basis in law, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1. A lawyer must also (1) reasonably consult with his or her client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) (2); and (2) explain a matter to a client as reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (b). Here, the foregoing rules were implicated in the Rollins-Lyons case when the respondent filed a motion to compel the ex-husband's polygraph examination. In support of the reliability of polygraph evidence, the respondent cited Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, which held that polygraph evidence could be admitted at a criminal trial to impeach or corroborate a defendant's testimony, see id. at 453-454. However, Vitello was clearly overruled a decade later in Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 202 (1989), which held that polygraph test results were inadmissible in criminal trials "either as substantive proof of guilt or innocence or as corroboration or impeachment of testimony." The respondent did not argue that Mendes is not applicable beyond criminal cases. Instead, she recklessly
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relied on a forty-three year old reversed case in an attempt to convince the ex-husband to submit to a polygraph examination. A competent lawyer, acting with reasonable diligence, would have been able to not only find that Vitello had been overruled decades prior, but would have reconciled with this in determining whether to file a motion to compel and what arguments to present in support of that motion. The respondent, as the result of sloppiness, failed to do so. Therefore, as the board determined, bar counsel proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated rules 1.1, 1.3, and 3.1. See Matter of Fitzgerald, 35 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 137, 144 (2019) (respondent violated rules 1.1 and 1.3 by filing incomplete or inadequately supported motion). See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1 comment 2 (lawyers must inform themselves about "applicable law and determine [if] they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions"). Further, the respondent failed to advise her client about the legal issues surrounding a motion to compel a polygraph examination.10 Therefore, bar counsel also proved by a
10 While the respondent testified to the contrary at the disciplinary hearing, her client testified that the respondent never provided such advice. The hearing committee credited the client over the respondent. "[F]actual findings predicated on the credibility of witnesses are the province of the hearing committee." Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 489 Mass. 1018, 1020 (2022). See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (5) (a), as
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preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated rules 1.4 (a) (2) and 1.4 (b). iii. Violation of rule 3.3. A lawyer is prohibited from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or failing to correct such a material statement previously made. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1). Here, as the hearing committee found, the respondent knowingly made a false statement of fact to the Probate and Family Court in the Melanson matter. Specifically, in moving to dismiss the guardianship and conservatorship petitions, the respondent falsely represented that disagreement with Doe's children was the basis for the dismissal. This misrepresentation "effectively obscured" the respondent's excessive charges as the real reason for seeking dismissal. Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. at 1018 (respondent violated rule 3.3 [a] [1] by filing estate inventory with probate court that knowingly misrepresented estate assets). She also failed to correct the misrepresentation, even after receiving signed assent forms from Doe's children. Accordingly, as determined by the board, bar counsel proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated rule 3.3 (a) (1).
appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009) (hearing committee is "sole judge" of credibility).
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b. Aggravating factors. In determining the appropriate sanction, the board properly considered eight aggravating factors, as I do now.11 First, the respondent had substantial experience in the practice of law at the time of her misconduct. See Matter of Foster, 492 Mass. 724, 751 (2023) ("Experience is considered as an aggravating factor because an experienced attorney should understand ethical obligations to a greater degree than a neophyte" [quotation and citation omitted]). Second, "the respondent violated multiple rules of professional conduct, spanning [her] representation of four different clients." Matter of Grayer, 483 Mass. 1013, 1018 (2019). Third, the respondent has lacked appreciation for her ethical obligations, failing to "acknowledge[] the nature, effects, or implications of her misconduct." Matter of Zankowski, 487 Mass. 140, 153 (2021). Indeed, the respondent has continuously maintained that her billing was appropriate and that she did not do anything wrong. See Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 456 (1998) (respondent's "lack of awareness of
11 The board, like the hearing committee, found that no factors mitigated the respondent's misconduct, rejecting her argument that the COVID-19 pandemic should be weighed in mitigation with respect to the Melanson and Kometti matters. Because the respondent has failed to establish a causal connection between the pandemic and her misconduct, see Matter of Ablitt, 486 Mass. 1011, 1018 (2021), I agree with the board.
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wrongdoing [was] proper for the board to consider"); Matter of Clooney, 403 Mass. 654, 657 (1988) ("respondent's persistent assertions that he did nothing wrong . . . demonstrated that he continues to be unmindful of certain basic ethical precepts of the legal profession" [quotation omitted]). Fourth, the respondent lacked candor at the disciplinary hearing, testifying falsely under oath multiple times. See Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 532 (2008) ("marked lack of candor" was aggravating factor). For example, the respondent: claimed that she did not have ultimate authority to set hourly billing rates at her firm, even though she was its sole equity owner; and refused to admit that the polygraph motion in the Rollins-Lyons matter was a motion to "compel," despite having previously admitted as much in her answer to the petition. While the respondent was entitled to defend herself, the hearing committee discredited this testimony, and her lack of candor is properly considered in aggravation. See Matter of Zankowski, 487 Mass. at 153. Fifth, Rollins-Lyons was a vulnerable client at the time of the respondent's misconduct. See Matter of Hayes, 493 Mass. 1010, 1016 (2023) (taking advantage of vulnerable clients serves as aggravating factor). The client's vulnerability stemmed from her belief that her ex-husband was sexually abusing their child. See Matter of Ruggiero, Supreme Judicial Ct., No. BD-2023-006,
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slip op. at 22 n.24 (Suffolk County Mar. 15, 2023) (client is "vulnerable" when "dealing with calamitous personal situation"); Matter of Font, 30 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 155, 156 (2014) (client was vulnerable because she was "distressed by her son's death and military's classification of that death as a suicide"). Sixth, in the Melanson matter, the respondent had a selfish motive in misrepresenting the client's reason for seeking dismissal of the petitions. See Matter of Greene, 477 Mass. 1019, 1021 (2017) (respondent's selfish motive was aggravating factor). Specifically, where Melanson wanted to dismiss the petitions due to the respondent's excessive fees, the respondent deliberately hid that fact in order to avoid close scrutiny of her fees. See Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. 294, 302 (2018) (respondent's use of disciplinary violations to conceal other misconduct weighed in aggravation) Seventh, the respondent "was motivated by [her] own financial interests and personal gain." Matter of Hilson, 448 Mass. 603, 619 (2007). The respondent financially profited from overstaffing cases with inexperienced employees who duplicated work or billed legal rates for nonlegal services. Eighth, the respondent has a prior disciplinary record. In 2018, the respondent stipulated to a three-month suspension, stayed for one year, for excessively billing three separate
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clients. See Matter of Shapiro, 34 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 512, 512 (2018).12 Prior misconduct, even if unrelated, is a "substantial factor" in determining an appropriate sanction. Matter of Dawkins, 412 Mass. 90, 96 (1992). As the respondent's prior misconduct is related to her present misconduct -- with both involving multiple violations of 1.5 (a) -- the prior misconduct is particularly significant. See Matter of Sargent, 496 Mass. 505, 517 (2025) ("respondent's prior disciplinary record . . . qualifies as a 'significant aggravating factor,' particularly given the similarities between the misconduct at issue in this case and the misconduct for which the respondent was [previously] sanctioned" [citation omitted]). c. Appropriate sanction. An appropriate sanction in a bar disciplinary matter is one that is necessary to protect the public and deter other attorneys from the same behavior. See Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. at 530. "Although the effect upon the respondent lawyer in any discipline case is an important consideration, the primary factor [in determining an appropriate sanction] is the effect upon, and perception of, the public and the bar." Matter of Finnerty, 418 Mass. 821, 829 (1994), citing Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 153, 156 (1983). See Matter of
12 The respondent also received an admonition in 2016 for unrelated misconduct -- improper disclosure of confidential information.
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Curry, supra at 520–521 (purpose of disciplinary proceedings is "to protect the public and maintain its confidence in the integrity of the bar and the fairness and impartiality of our legal system"). In considering the appropriate sanction, I am mindful that "the board's recommendation is entitled to substantial deference." Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 88 (1994). At the same time, I am not bound by the board's recommendation. See Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. at 157. I am also mindful that "[e]ach case must be decided on its own merits and every offending attorney must receive the disposition most appropriate in the circumstances." Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, 392 Mass. 827, 837 (1984). See Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 328 (1998), quoting Matter of McInerney, 389 Mass. 528, 531 (1983) ("All bar discipline proceedings take into account the 'totality of the circumstances'"). Further, where a case is not unique and does not involve a matter of first impression, the sanction must not be "markedly disparate" from the sanction imposed in comparable cases. Matter of Foley, 439 Mass. 324, 333 (2003). Here, considering the "cumulative effect of the several violations committed by the respondent" (citation omitted), Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. at 1021, I conclude that an eighteen-
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month suspension is appropriate.13 In terms of comparable cases, I believe Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. at 91, where an eighteen-month suspension was imposed, to be fairly analogous. In that case, the respondent engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, specifically having: "(1) induced [the complainant] to retain him with the intent of thereby collecting unwarranted fees; probated the Estate of [the complainant's] husband under false pretenses; intentionally performed and billed for unnecessary and improper legal services; and made false and fraudulent representations to the Probate Court, to [the complainant] and her family, and to the Bar Counsel[;] . . .
"(2) charged and attempted to collect a grossly excessive fee[;] . . . [and]
13 Because my focus is on the respondent's violations in the aggregate, together with various aggravating factors, I am not persuaded that a lesser sanction should be imposed merely because some of the respondent's violations, if considered in isolation, could warrant a lesser sanction. See Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. at 1022-1023 (concluding that fifteen-month suspension for, inter alia, charging and collecting clearly excessive fees was appropriate, notwithstanding that some of respondent's actions, "[c]onsidered individually, . . . would warrant a public reprimand").
Further, in considering cases cited by the respondent, bar counsel, and the board in which lesser sanctions were imposed, I believe those cases to be distinguishable. For example, the respondent in Matter of Rafferty, 26 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 538, 538 (2010), joined in recommending a four-month suspension. See Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 312 (1993) (joint recommendations or stipulations have "no influence on our reasoning"). Even setting that aside, the respondent in Matter of Rafferty, supra, (1) committed his misconduct against a single client, who was not found to be vulnerable; (2) did not violate rules 3.1 and 3.3 (a) (1); and (3) was not found to lack appreciation for his ethical obligations or candor at the disciplinary hearing.
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"(3) failed to seek the lawful objectives of his client and prejudiced and damaged [the complainant] during the course of the professional relationship . . . ."
Id. at 84–85. In determining the proper sanction in Matter of Tobin, the Supreme Judicial Court noted the respondent's "willingness to place his own financial interest above his client's right to dispassionate professional advice," "the respondent's [unrelated] discipline history," and the absence of any special mitigating circumstances. Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. at 90-91. While not featuring in the court's discussion of a sanction, the court also noted that the respondent's testimony was "frequently inconsistent and implausible," and that he had acted "for the purpose of concealing the fact that there was no necessity to probate [the] estate." Id. at 83. To be sure, Matter of Tobin is not completely on all fours with this case. "[T]he respondent's inducement of his client to retain him for unnecessary services" was a prominent consideration in Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. at 90, while such misconduct is not present in this case. Further, the misrepresentations in Matter of Tobin were more voluminous than the misrepresentation here.14 See id. at 83-84.
14 Still, the respondent's misrepresentation cannot be disregarded. "An intentional misrepresentation to a court typically warrants a suspension of at least one year," Matter of
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Although Matter of Tobin is therefore not perfectly analogous, it need not be. See Matter of Hurley, 418 Mass. 649, 655 (1994) (court "need not endeavor to find perfectly analogous cases"). Moreover, several rule violations and aggravating factors exist in this case that did not exist in Matter of Tobin, including the respondent's charging of excessive fees across four different client matters, her prior disciplinary history involving the same rule violations, her lack of appreciation for her ethical obligations, and the vulnerable status of one of her clients. On balance, I believe the magnitude of the misconduct to be comparable between the two cases. Accordingly, the appropriate sanction is an eighteen-month suspension. 3. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, an order shall be entered suspending the respondent from the practice of law in the Commonwealth for a period of eighteen (18) months.
By the court, /s/ Frank M. Gaziano Frank M. Gaziano Associate Justice
Entered: December 11, 2025
Moran, 479 Mass. at 1021, while "a lesser sanction, in the range of a six-month suspension, is often sufficient where an attorney's misrepresentations amount to less than a full-blown 'fraud on the court,'" Matter of O'Toole, 31 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 511, 522 (2015).
SUFFOLK, SS.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY NO: BD-2025-057
IN RE: Anna Shapiro
ORDER OF TERM SUSPENSION
This matter came before the Court, Gaziano, J., on an Information and Record of Proceedings pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8(6), with the recommendation and vote of the Board of Bar Overseers filed by the Board on July 30, 2025. After a hearing was held on October 23, 2025, attended by assistant bar counsel, and the respondent represented by counsel; and in accordance with the Memorandum of Decision dated December 11, 2025; It is ORDERED that: 1. Anna Shapiro is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for a period of eighteen (18) months. In accordance with S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17(3), the suspension shall be effective thirty days after the date of the entry of this Order. The lawyer, after the entry of
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this Order, shall not accept any new retainer or engage as a lawyer for another in any new case or legal matter of any nature. During the period between the entry date of this Order and its effective date, however, the lawyer may wind up and complete, on behalf of any client, all matters which were pending on the entry date. It is FURTHER ORDERED that: 2. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry of this Order, the lawyer shall: a) file a notice of withdrawal as of the effective date of the suspension with every court, agency, or tribunal before which a matter is pending, together with a copy of the notices sent pursuant to paragraphs 2(c) and 2(d) of this Order, the client's or clients' place of residence, and the case caption and docket number of the client's or clients' proceedings; b) resign as of the effective date of the suspension all appointments as guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other fiduciary, attaching to the resignation a copy of the notices sent to the wards, heirs, or beneficiaries pursuant to paragraphs 2(c) and 2(d) of this Order, the place of residence of the wards, heirs, or beneficiaries, and the case caption and docket number of the proceedings, if any;
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c) provide notice to all clients and to all wards, heirs, and beneficiaries that the lawyer has been suspended; that she is disqualified from acting as a lawyer after the effective date of the suspension; and that, if not represented by co-counsel, the client, ward, heir, or beneficiary should act promptly to substitute another lawyer or fiduciary or to seek legal advice elsewhere, calling attention to any urgency arising from the circumstances of the case; d) provide notice to counsel for all parties (or, in the absence of counsel, the parties) in pending matters that the lawyer has been suspended and, as a consequence, is disqualified from acting as a lawyer after the effective date of the suspension; e) make available to all clients being represented in pending matters any papers or other property to which they are entitled, calling attention to any urgency for obtaining the papers or other property; f) refund any part of any fees paid in advance that have not been earned; and g) close every IOLTA, client, trust or other fiduciary account and properly disburse or otherwise transfer all client and fiduciary funds in her possession, custody or control.
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All notices required by this paragraph shall be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, in a form approved by the Board. 3. Within twenty-one (21) days after the date of entry of this Order, the lawyer shall file with the Office of the Bar Counsel an affidavit certifying that the lawyer has fully complied with the provisions of this Order and with bar disciplinary rules. Appended to the affidavit of compliance shall be: a) a copy of each form of notice, the names and addresses of the clients, wards, heirs, beneficiaries, attorneys, courts and agencies to which notices were sent, and all return receipts or returned mail received up to the date of the affidavit. Supplemental affidavits shall be filed covering subsequent return receipts and returned mail. Such names and addresses of clients shall remain confidential unless otherwise requested in writing by the lawyer or ordered by the court; b) a schedule showing the location, title and account number of every bank account designated as an IOLTA, client, trust or other fiduciary account and of every account in which the lawyer holds or held as of the entry date of this Order any client, trust or fiduciary funds; c) a schedule describing the lawyer's disposition of
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all client and fiduciary funds in the lawyer's possession, custody or control as of the entry date of this Order or thereafter; d) such proof of the proper distribution of such funds and the closing of such accounts as has been requested by the bar counsel, including copies of checks and other instruments; e) a list of all other state, federal and administrative jurisdictions to which the lawyer is admitted to practice; f) the residence or other street address where communications to the lawyer may thereafter be directed; and g) any and all bar registration cards issued to the lawyer by the Board of Bar Overseers. The lawyer shall retain copies of all notices sent and shall maintain complete records of the steps taken to comply with the notice requirements of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 17. 4. Within twenty-one (21) days after the entry date of this Order, the lawyer shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County: a) a copy of the affidavit of compliance required by paragraph 3 of this Order; b) a list of all other state, federal and
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administrative jurisdictions to which the lawyer is admitted to practice; and c) the residence or other street address where communications to the lawyer may thereafter be directed. 5. The lawyer’s reinstatement to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts shall be pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (2)(4) and (5).
Dated: December 11, 2025
By the Court, (Gaziano, J.)
_____________________________ Allison S. Cartwright, Clerk
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